

CHAPTER NINE:

THE RULES OF ARCHITECTURAL POLITENESS.

It was Goethe, I believe, who called Gothic architecture "a petrified religion." I cannot but regard the perfection of domestic architecture as an embodied courtesy.¹

..the resources of an artist are required to give an artistic and poignant expression even of rudeness. Montgomery Schuyler, "The Chicago Renaissance," (Mumford 1972)

Introduction

The previous chapter was an attempt to relate Garbett's aesthetics of architectural expression to its use in society. This chapter, the last in the section dealing with the first chapter of Garbett's *Treatise*, starts off with an analysis of the formal rules for an architectural politeness. The difficulties of prescribing architectural forms for an architectural politeness necessarily lead to a negative discussion about those things

1. *Treatise*, p. 8.

that expressly do *not* constitute such a politeness. Having thus arrived at the problem of ornament we pass on naturally to a concern with the exact status of architecture as a fine art and so to the mechanics of Garbett's aesthetics of architectural expression and its relation to associationism.

The place of politeness in Garbett's system

Architectural politeness occupies a meta-level in Garbett's theory, representing the point at which the aesthetics of general morality fuses with normative discourse. The problem for Garbett was that the concept of architectural politeness could not be translated into a body of prescriptions without immediately undermining the concept. Architectural politeness could only translate into an attitude informed by a specific moral doctrine. That moral attitude then enabled the artist to apply certain forms and arrangements in certain situations.

Precisely because politeness is responsible for setting the attitude of the

architect with regard to his undertaking, it is placed first and foremost in Garbett's hierarchical subdivision of the aims and requirements of architecture. This needs to be explained, as politeness would naturally seem to fit within the concept of architectural expression, which is much higher up the scale of Garbett's chain of beauty. After all, the evaluation of a building must explore a wide spectrum of human experience before it can be designated polite. All sorts of little signs become relevant: the marks of a building's history; the remnants of its previous owner(s); the building's relation to its immediate geographical and temporal environment as well as the environment's effect on the building. All these criteria and many more besides, manipulate the building's effect on the beholder.

The ability of a building to be polite also carries worrying implications with regard to Garbett's obvious desire for a rigid, objective aesthetics. One implication of this is that it is no longer possible to institute rigid aesthetic categories where

disinterestedness, or purely formal qualities can be untangled from the web of psychological corruptions. Nor can it be clear where architecture becomes a distinct entity, separate from other forms of human activity or experience. The architect, the owner and the spectator become novelists, constantly writing and re-writing the building. The architect is only the first and, in many cases, most helpless participant in a game of *complete the story*. He merely sets the scene which is subsequently judged according to the sophistication of the emotional response extracted from the person reading the building and filling out the burgeoning plot.

Garbett's use of such eminently subjective concepts as politeness, expression and poetry made the perception of architecture as phenomenologically complex and involved as literary criticism. Because of the fact that the whole range of human experience had to be dragged into any aesthetic judgement with regard to a building's expression, the formulation of an objective

normative tradition was made practically impossible.

Natural versus artificial politeness: the calculated lie

The possibility of *affecting* consideration in architecture by way of a predetermined language of polite forms, forces the anthroponomical analogy on which the possibility of architectural expression rests, deeper into the moral maze of human behaviour. Everything that is conventionalised is liable to the disingenuous. For this reason Garbett had to make a distinction between a *natural* and an *artificial* politeness. In order to remain logically consistent, architecture was being forced to participate in yet another characteristic of intelligent and moral life: it could lie.

A positively false and predatory generosity, for instance, could be imagined to look something like the house of sweets and biscuits which, appearing so innocent and delectable, tempted Hansel and Gretel to eat from it only to find it was a

horrible trap set by the pædophagous owner. The castle or keep in Garbett's metaphorical world has already been identified as the architectural equivalent of the selfish oyster.²

The dangers of a conventionalised language of architectural politeness is perhaps best illustrated by Garbett's rather unkind but not untypical treatment of the Spanish, who, because of their conventions of politeness had supposedly forced their buildings to exude a degenerate form of flattery and ostentation. The *inhabitants of the East* were similarly seen as good examples of what a strict adherence to a single language of forms can do. Their steadfast *adherence to forms whose original intention is forgotten*, caused their

2. The fact that both the keep and the oyster have a legitimate need to protect themselves in a potentially hostile environment seems to have been ignored in Garbett's translation of nature's language of symbols.

architecture to sink into meaninglessness and stagnation.³

What Garbett did not realise is that, on his premises, the distinction between a natural- and an artificial politeness could only be established *a posteriori*. Who could possibly discern, without being first prepared, the difference in meaning between a parrot's party phrase, uttered without intending to signify anything except the parrot's ability to imitate, and the same phrase uttered by its teacher? Artificiality of expression can only be established when the architect or owner has been discovered to have been calculating and deliberately deceptive or merely unthinking and perfunctory.⁴ This means that some lies always remain unnoticed and some truths will be seen as lies. Architectural behaviour is now almost identical with human behaviour where a good liar is often rewarded.

3. *Treatise*, p. 8.

4. see also *Treatise*, p. 252.

The rules for an architectural politeness

Fortunately Garbett never even attempted to formulate a specific language of forms which he thought would achieve an absolute validity in terms of being architecturally polite. That would have trivialised the concept beyond endurance. Politeness cannot be related to a straightforward and fixed language of forms. It cannot be a style of architecture.

The problems such a language would encounter are at once made clear by a simple example. In a situation where, for instance, there are two thick walls which are identical in every material respect except in function and context, it is nevertheless possible to designate the one as rude and the other polite. The motive behind their thickness qualifies each wall as either selfish or generous. *Das Ding an sich* is inert. Garbett would probably have accused the thick walls of an evil baron's keep or of a usurer's stronghold as selfish and mercenary. The thick walls of a Gothic church would probably have constituted a

polite and generous indication of a sacrificial attitude in the devout.

He gives a number of examples of buildings and architects whom he considers to be polite. One such example is Palladio:

*In a building entirely plain, in the strictest sense of the word, i.e. without any feature, or any moulding, cutting, or shaping, not required by its utilitarian purposes, courtesy might seem to many the only architectural merit we could expect. But some of the buildings of this kind by Palladio (stables, out-houses, &c.), and a few by other masters, demonstrate clearly that not only may rudeness be avoided, but positive beauty created, in such buildings, without the introduction of any decorative feature, but by a studious collation of whatever will display design, order, and congruity, in the relative dimensions and arrangement of the necessary or useful features.*⁵

5. *Treatise*, pp. 14-15 The passage is an interesting anticipation of the Modern Movement with its concentration on the handling of spaces and masses, the arrangement of elementary shapes and the criminalisation of ornament. Garbett takes a different road altogether from the one paved by Ruskin. The latter took architecture to refer, quite exclusively, to the stone surface and not the division of space. Ruskin's definition of Jacob Voorthuis

Historical buildings should only ever be used for analysis and the extrapolation of causal principles. Though Garbett recommends the study of Palladio he does not recommend a new wave of palladianism. Instead the passage is interesting in its introduction of an architectural axiom, namely the opposition between the naked requirement and the suggestion. Palladio's genius lay in being able to supplement the naked requirement of a building by applying forms which could suggest the relative value of each element in a building. That idea represents an attempt to translate Garbett's always rather unsatisfactory demand for thought and consideration into concrete rules.

Politeness must consist of a sophisticated framework of appropriate responses to a continually varying configuration of circumstances. Even so there are certain constants to be observed in polite buildings.

architecture was later confirmed and sharpened in his preface to the second edition of *The Seven Lamps*, p. 15 f.

The all important question: How do I build politely? becomes problematic within this context. Greenough correctly deduced Garbett's only available answer: You cannot build politely unless you yourself become polite. Nothing can stand *in the stead of an honest intention*:

It must be observed, writes Garbett, that the tribes of the savage nations always exhibit this natural politeness. Let them be ever so rude in construction or in decoration, or in both, they are never rude in expression; never do they seem made for self alone, like the oyster, shut up in the narrowness of its shell, pushing forth excrescences wherever its internal purposes suggest, without appearing to know there is a world outside. On the contrary, the rudest huts present on their exterior some evidence of unnecessary design, some regularity or symmetry not required by their internal purposes, and this stamps them as Architecture. It shows an aim beyond convenience and stability; it shows the spectator that he, even he, has been cared for as well as the owner, and the structure belongs not altogether to a man, but in some sort also to humanity...as in the models from which these children of nature learnt their art, there is nothing made for itself.... The name Architecture, therefore, (...) must apply to these huts and wigwams, as well as to those buildings which conform to all the

rules of a systemised etiquette, invaluable to those who can use it aright, but utterly incapable of standing in the stead of an honest intention and desire to be what you would appear.⁶

Apart from reminding us that benevolence is an agent of civilisation and not an effect of it (so that, in contradistinction to Quatremère de Quincy, even savages are able to exhibit politeness) this passage shows us that the basis for an architectural politeness resides in two constants from which a normative theory can depart. The first is the moral intention of the architect and the patron. The second is the need for a particular etiquette to make those intentions understood by onlookers and to ensure that those intentions are taken in the correct spirit. Certain forms of politeness can be suitable only in specific situations, at specific levels of civilisation.

The theorist has to resort to the anthroponomical analogy, analysing the axioms guiding human action and seeking to translate those actions into propitious

6. *Treatise*, p. 8.

architectural gestures. This aspect is significant to Garbett's whole approach to architectural theory.

Garbett's theory of politeness was a preliminary stage in the switch from a conventional, model- or style-based normative theory to a grammatical or axiomatic approach. Garbett expressly did not reveal a finished model for architects to copy. That is because he realised that such a model would immediately start to undermine itself precisely because it would allow the dislocation between intention and form. Through easy misuse, such a model would be quickly hollowed out to become an instance of rudeness. Garbett's principles of unity amidst variety, contrast versus gradation, and the hierarchical subordination of forms represented important attempts to formulate mathematical or grammatical axioms for architecture which were supposed to precede the formation of any architectural style. Garbett tried to construct an Architectural *langue*, a grammar of architectural composition. That *langue*

rejects the *parole*, that is the Greek, gothic and renaissance trappings which can be transplanted. Instead historical styles must do service as material through which it is possible to form an understanding of that underlying grammar.

Ornament and the inversion of the chain of beauty

If politeness could be described as an attitude showing a sensitivity to the propriety of forms and materials with reference to certain situations, it was essential for Garbett to concentrate on pointing out those things which expressly did not automatically constitute architecturally polite behaviour. One of these, which has already been discussed, was the mere copying of forms which, in their particular context, could be designated as polite. Another concerned the super-addition of ornament to a building. Being in fact one of the main causes of architecture's disease in nineteenth century England, the application of ornament to buildings could hardly be considered polite behaviour:

Ornament and decoration can never give or increase the expression of unselfishness; while it may often give that of ostentation, a particular form of selfishness.

And again:

*You cannot hide by ornament the want of art..*⁷

In Garbett's world ornament was seen as but the sacrifice of money, not of time and thought. And if any miserable witling dared to come up with popular pedantries such the one winging about time being money, Garbett had his well-rehearsed reply ready:

*...yes, but the converse is not true, money is not time, still less is it thought.*⁸

7. *Treatise*, p. 13

8. *Ibidem*.

*Moreover, as the ornaments are generally of the most mean and poverty-stricken description, they excite the idea, not merely of ostentation, but of the most offensive kind of ostentation -that of a proud beggar.*⁹

Because of its mechanised production, ornament could no longer be considered a sacrifice: it was just as costly to produce something without ornament as it was to produce something with. This had already been pointed out by Ruskin.¹⁰

As beauty was the result of an accumulation of causes, ornament, though not essential to architectural beauty, could only help.¹¹ Garbett's concept of architectural perfection can be seen as pyramidal and accumulative. Ornament was considered by him to be a low beauty. It could not do much to improve a building.

9. *Treatise*, p. 14

10. Ruskin, *Seven Lamps*, "Lamp of Life," § XXIV, p. 202.

11. *Treatise*, p. 15.

Strangely enough, if ornament was to be in a position to add something to a building, then the whole superstructure of architectural perfection had to be inverted. All the higher qualities of architecture had to be in place *before* any ornament could be allowed to add to a building's charms.

In order therefore, to make sure that ornament was contributing to a building's beauty rather than detracting from it, Garbett devised a test: the vulgarity test. It goes as follows: Remove from the design of a building all ornament, all fitter, and see if *in its naked state* it still excites our admiration.¹² If not, all the ornament in the world will not improve it, it will only, writes Garbett quoting Milizia, dazzle the vulgar.¹³

12. *Treatise*, p. 16.

13. *Treatise*, p. 16: *E dunque evidente che con tutta la profusione degli ornati più ricchi non dedotti da necessità nè da utile, un edificio mal inteso sarà più brutto come più s'imbruttisce la brutta donna che più si adorna.* F. Milizia (1781) On Francesco Milizia see O'Neal (1954) pp. 12-15; Brües (1961) pp. 69-113; Rykwert (1981) p. 65-69; Prozzillo (1971); Kruff (1985) p. 228-232. Milizia's *Principi d'Architettura civile*, Finale 1781, 3 vols. (later editions: Bassano 1785; 1804; 1813; 1825; and Milan 1832) were not as generally available as his *Memorie* which had been translated by Mrs. Edward Cresy into English.

*If, on the other hand, Garbett writes, the bare carcass remains beautiful, though stripped of all its finery, all that finery may be restored, and none of it will be added in vain provided it be consistent with itself and with the character of the building, properly placed, and consistent everywhere with its situation.*¹⁴

Here we see that Garbett's chain of values had to be inverted for normative purposes. The real summit, as in the chain of being, is in fact the point of origin and perfection; the point from which creation emanates. Only the architecturally complete building is allowed to wear ornament with impunity.

Garbett continues the passage by contradicting one of Ruskin's slogans:

*It is one of the affectations of architects to speak of overcharged ornaments. Ornament cannot be overcharged if it be good, and is always overcharged when it is bad.*¹⁵

14. *Treatise*, p. 16.

15. J. Ruskin, *Seven Lamps*, "Lamp of Sacrifice," § XV, p. 15, quoted by Garbett, *Treatise*, p. 16.

On the contrary, writes Garbett, even good ornament can be misplaced. But Ruskin is quick to reply in his "Answer to Mr. Garbett" appended to the first edition of the *Stones of Venice*, that misplacement is naturally included in the meaning of badness.

Paragone: expression in architecture, music and gastronomy

*Ornament is by no means the highest beauty or merit at which [architecture] should aim. If architecture did not aim higher it would not belong among the fine arts. The mere fact of an art being intended to please, is not sufficient to place it in this rank. If it were, cookery would have to be placed among the fine arts.*¹⁶

The time had come to refine his own remarkably inclusive conception of architecture; to make it dislocate itself from all sorts of socially polluting associations. But Garbett did not want to submit to Ruskin's

16. *Treatise*, p. 18.

definition of architecture as an act of (intellectual) decoration. Instead he turned to James Fergusson's classification of the arts as published in his *Historical Inquiry into the True Principles of Beauty in Art, More Especially with Reference to Architecture*, of 1849.¹⁷

The primary purpose of the only volume of Fergusson's *Historical Inquiry* to have been published was not normative. That part was planned for a second volume which never appeared. The objective of the first volume was to establish a metaphysical basis for the arts, for architecture in particular, and to fit the arts into the great (Protestant) scheme of things. Fergusson's ambition was to re-evaluate

17. For a brief and dismissive treatment of Fergusson's system of classification see Pevsner (1972) p. 239-240. Worse is Maurice Craig (1968) Much better but necessarily geared towards the American reception of his thinking is Robert Winter (1958) 25-30. The most recent studies on Fergusson are Kohane (1993) and Raub (1993).

man's knowledge in relation to a contemporary understanding of universe and human civilisation in the manner of Francis Bacon. ¹⁸ Fergusson wanted to

18.Fergusson *An Historical Inquiry into the True Principles of Beauty*, Part II, Section I. Divisions of Science, pp. 15 ff. He mentions Bacon's *De Augmento Scientiarum*, lib. ii; The impotence of Aristotle and Plato; D'Alembert [note: *Melanges*, tom i. p. 239. Amsterdam, 1767.]: *the French Encyclopaedists attempted to complete the classification of Bacon. But no polishing or improving can ever make a pyramid placed on it's apex a stable building; their additions only served to render more apparent the defects which the simplicity of the original had prevented many from observing.* Bentham's *Chrestomathia*, London 1816 and Ampere's *Essai sur la philosophie des Sciences*, Paris 1838-43 calling them artificial; Great praise is reserved for Vincent of Beauvais: Long anterior to any of these systems -in the depths of the middle ages- the Monkish

Jacob Voorthuis

*Encyclopaedists hit on a classification, which, with a little industry rightly applied, might long before this have been made perfect. The best and completest specimen of it that I know of, is found in the Speculum Majus of Vincent de Beauvais, [note: *Speculum Quadruplex*, 7 vols. fol. Argentinae, 1473. See also Daunou, *Hist Litt. de la France*, vol. xviii] the friend and preceptor of Louis the Saint. In the true theological spirit of that age, the system was founded on the Bible; and taking the first chapter of Genesis as their guide, they classified human knowledge according to the succession in which things are represented to have been created in the six days which are there allotted to the task. And as Moses in describing them had followed the reasonable and apparent importance of the objects, he very nearly laid the ground of a perfect system; the one great difficulty being the intervention of the creation of the sun and moon between that of the mineral and vegetable kingdoms and that of the animals. The spirit*

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establish the relative worth of each human activity by performing a new classification of natures and essences. The arts of man

*of that age would, probably, scarcely have admitted of the rectification of this anomaly in classification; but otherwise the system is so nearly a correct natural one, that had the philosophers of the period only persevered in improving it, correcting its error, and avoiding the unnecessary repetitions into which it sometimes falls, before two centuries had passed over it must have become so perfect that every additional advance in science would have served only to consolidate and complete it; and long before this the classification of human knowledge would have been as perfect as that of any individual science now is. He also has great praise for Whewell's *Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*, vol. ii. p. 281, et passim.; Auguste Comte's *Philosophie Positive*, vol. i. Introduction and Coleridge's *Encyclopaedia Metropolitana*. On Fergusson's sources see Raub (1993)*

were thus divided into three categories representing a *specific merit or excellence*. There were *technical* merits, the lowest of the three, followed by *aesthetic-* and crowned by *phonetic* merits.

According to Garbett's reading of Fergusson's essay, technic related to mechanical excellence and finish.¹⁹ Aesthetic to the power of pleasing. This included the whole province of beauty *in the ordinary sense* which appeared to refer to beauty as a form of sensory pleasure rather than as an emotive and more complex response.²⁰ The last category was the phonetic merit, which referred to the speaking arts, or *those which are capable of expressing a meaning, or, in fact serving the purpose of language.*²¹

Every art was allocated twelve points by Fergusson. These were subsequently distributed according to their relative merits, thus dividing each art not according to a

19. *Treatise*, p. 18.

20. *Treatise*, p. 18 ff. Actually this was called cal-aesthetic by Fergusson, who used the word aesthetic to denote everything to do with the senses.

21. *Treatise*, p. 19.

qualitative- but according to a quantitative difference.²²

The following, writes Garbett, are a few specimens selected from this curious table:

	Technic	Aesthetic
Phonetic		

22. Garbett did not mention the subsequent system of points by which a hierarchy of arts ranging from ventilation to eloquence was made possible. Technic merits counted for just one, while the marks in the aesthetic column had to be multiplied by two and the ones in the phonetic column by three. In this way Eloquence, a purely phonetic art, with just one mark allocated to the aesthetic column and apparently requiring no technical tools, scores highest with 35 points while heating and ventilation, the mirror images of eloquence, having been allocated 11 marks for technical requirements, one for aesthetic (Fergusson's meaning of the term) and none for phonetic qualities, scores only 13. Fergusson (1849) p. 140.

	portion	portion	portion
portion			
Gastronomy.....	7	5	0
Jewellery.....	7	4	1
Architecture (Greek)	4	4	4
Music (Vocal).....	2	6	4
Historical Painting.	3	3	6
Drama.....	2	2	8
Poetry.....	0	2	10
Eloquence.....		0	1
11			

He continued by quoting Fergusson: "Thus," adds he, "I conceive a perfect object of gastronomy to consist of 7 or 8 parts of plain hunger satisfying food, and 4 or 5 of palatable ingredients.."²³

Architecture was able to distinguish itself through the equal distribution of its merits. It must be kept in mind however, that this equal distribution concerned only its *highest* productions, such as the Parthenon. In other words architecture could distinguish itself from gastronomy in

23. *Treatise*, p. 20, cf. Fergusson's actual table and its explanation in Fergusson (1849) pp. 140-3.

degree only. Whatever the system's virtues or short-comings, to Garbett it was necessary to *qualify* the difference between architecture and gastronomy, not *quantify* it.²⁴ There had to be a real, metaphysical difference between the two arts which could in turn justify their social difference.

The part of Fergusson's taxonomy which tried to refine the differences between the arts by converting their merits

24. The comparison with Roger de Piles table appended to his *Peinture par Principes* (1708) is unavoidable. De Piles tried to establish the relative worth of each painter according to a system of marks evaluating their composition, use of line and colour and expression. cf. Barasch (1985) p. 341. Barasch calls this tendency typical of academic thought. That explains the phenomenon only if one sees academism as an attempt to deny the subjective element in judgement, to achieve as Santayana calls it an objectified beauty which can thus be adequately quantified.

to a rank on a social ladder of value was not quoted by Garbett. He took the difference in value between architecture and gastronomy as a given and did not want to draw attention to the fact the difference in Fergusson's system between the creations of a good cook and the Parthenon only amounted to a miserly six points on a scale of 35! Brunelleschi's Pazzi chapel might on that basis have conceivably equalled the score of a summer pudding!

The objectivity of Fergusson's judgement went unquestioned. Garbett was not aware that Fergusson's system revealed only his personal tastes, infected as they were with the cultural norms of the time. Nor was Fergusson himself aware of this. Neither of them at least considered that to be a weakness in the system. This would certainly account for Fergusson's rather embarrassing evaluation of eloquence when seen in relation to his own prose: according to his system, the art of eloquence could boast of no technical merits whatsoever!

All that Garbett objected to was that the system was not felt to be refined enough. Fergusson did admittedly think it risky to put gastronomy on the same *level* as architecture. He rightly feared that it might expose his whole system to ridicule. But if the equality of gastronomy and architecture was considered risky to Fergusson, it was anathema to Garbett. The comparison persuaded Garbett that Fergusson's classification had to be altered *to rescue architecture from this low company, by showing that it is capable of attaining some end which gastronomy cannot reach.*²⁵

Fergusson, as later became clear, would have liked to develop the analogy between gastronomy and architecture through the medium of *taste*, which, with a hindsight untroubled by desires for relative superiority, appears self-evident and very useful.²⁶ Garbett, on the other hand, was

25. *Treatise*, p. 18.

26. Peter Collins (1965) pp. 167-172, One could wish the essay were not so brief.

troubled by such desires. He wanted to show how *the architect is superior to the picture-frame maker or the cook.*²⁷

The difficulty with Fergusson's system, Garbett argued, was that the author did not distinguish between expression and the power of actual speech. The category of the Aesthetic in Fergusson's system stands for *beautiful without expression*, while Phonetics was meant to relate art to meaning, that is, narrative meaning: a phonetic art serves the purposes of language.²⁸ Architecture could never be phonetic unless it adopted a phonetic language of some sort, either in the form of sculptural decoration or in the form of hieroglyphics, lettering or heraldic devices.

27. *Treatise*, p. 20.

28. *Treatise*, p. 18-19. whereas, he writes, its common acceptation is closer to artistic and its etymological derivation comes from sensuous, or relating to the senses. In fact that etymological derivation was precisely the one used by Fergusson who used the word cal-aesthetic to denote beauty in art. To prevent confusion, I use the word aesthetics in the sense given to it by C.S. Peirce, that is as a name for the normative discipline which concerns itself with the description of qualities. Peirce (1960) V. §122 ff., esp. § 127. The phrase beauty without expression would thus appear to be a primitive version of Kant's criterion of disinterestedness in aesthetic judgements of taste, as any kind of expression automatically must relate the object to the subject's desires and thus promote interest.

²⁹ Without the use of these a building could not narrate. Architecture, by itself therefore, could not be considered a phonetic art, it could not tell a tale. This inability was something it shared with instrumental music. For that reason Garbett wanted to introduce a fourth category which would mediate between a disinterested pleasure, "a mere aesthetic beauty," without expression and a phonetic or narrative art which can describe and assert.³⁰

29. every one perceives the difference of expression between festive and plaintive, martial and sacred music; nearly everyone is affected with the precise emotion which the notes are intended to convey. But that is all, - they have expression, but no meaning... They [masters and enthusiasts in the art] tell us (and I believe with perfect honesty), that they can understand the interpretation of a piece of music, the occasion for which it was composed, the scene it describes, the story it tells. Well let them prove it. Some Germans have lately attempted to do so, (See the Athenaeum for 1848, p. 1216) and have thereby at once proved their honesty, and exposed their complete delusion; for different enthusiasts have found the most amusingly different scenes or stories in the same notes, and no two give the same version. (...) An overture without words can express nothing more than a building without phonetic sculpture and painting. I should think that music and architecture might probably be placed exactly on a par in this respect, - capable of conveying the same variety of emotions. In: *Treatise*, p. 21-22.

30. *Treatise*, p. 21.

That fourth category was to be expression. ³¹ Expression, Garbett wrote, differed from a language in that its vocabulary is limited to the emotions it can evoke. It cannot tell a tale, but it can enhance a tale's emotional charge; it is a meta-language which is able to supplement the actual narration by putting it into a context, a setting. That is how scenery, climate, smells, architecture and music tend to function in novels and theatre. Music and architecture could in this respect be put on the same par:

..having about the same compass of expression, capable of conveying the same variety of emotions, and with the same

31. In fact Garbett's distinction between the phonetic or speech and the expressive or emotive in his critique of Fergusson's classification of the arts was probably suggested to him by Alison's use of association in the latter's explanation of the mechanics of expression. cf. Alison, *Op. Cit.*, Essay I, Chap. 1.

distinctness, provided we cultivate both with the same purity.³² and: An overture without words can express nothing more than a building without phonetic sculpture or painting.³³

Other arts which shared this fourth category without having the ability to be phonetic as well were landscape gardening and landscape painting, portraiture, whether in paint or in stone, and the idealisation of single figures.

It was the absence of an ability to express emotion which prevented the arts of cookery and perfumery from encroaching on the status of architecture:

A flavour or smell cannot be solemn or cheerful, grand or elegiac. Though Burke thought there ought to be such a thing as a sublime odour, he never pretended to have smelt one.³⁴

32. *Treatise*, p. 22.

33. *Treatise*, p. 22.

34. *Treatise*, p. 24.

...it is this quality -expression-, and not mere aesthetic (or unqualified) beauty, which entitles the work possessing it to a place among the fine arts.³⁵

The moment Garbett denied cookery, perfumery and ornament the power to express emotions he was forced to make a further distinction, set up yet another culturally determined opposition. But that is the subject of the next chapter.

35. *Treatise*, p. 23.